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Independent directors are an important feature of modern corporate law. Courts 
and lawmakers around the world increasingly rely on these directors to protect 
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investors from controlling shareholder opportunism. In this Article, we argue that the 
existing director-election regime significantly undermines the ability of independent 
directors to effectively perform their oversight role. Both the election and retention of 
independent directors normally depend on the controlling shareholders. As a result, 
these directors have incentives to go along with controllers’ wishes, or, at least, have 
inadequate incentives to protect public investors. 
To induce independent directors to perform their oversight role, we argue, some 
independent directors should be accountable to public investors. This can be achieved 
by empowering investors to determine or at least substantially influence the election 
or retention of these directors. These “enhanced-independence” directors should play 
a key role in vetting “conflicted decisions,” where the interests of the controller and 
public investors substantially diverge, but not have a special role with respect to other 
corporate issues. Enhancing the independence of some directors would substantially 
improve the protection of public investors without undermining the ability of the 
controller to set the firm’s strategy. 
We explain how the Delaware courts, as well as other lawmakers in the United 
States and around the world, can introduce or encourage enhanced-independence 
arrangements. Our analysis offers a framework of director election rules that allows 
policymakers to produce the precise balance of power between controlling shareholders 
and public investors that they find appropriate. We also analyze the proper role of 
enhanced-independence directors as well as respond to objections to their use. Overall, 
we show that relying on enhanced-independence directors, rather than independent 
directors whose elections fully depend on the controller, can provide a better 
foundation for investor protection in controlled companies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, Google adopted a controversial recapitalization plan that allowed 
it to issue a new class of nonvoting stock.1 This plan enabled Google to continue 
raising capital without weakening its founders’ control over the company. To 
address the concern that the plan would benefit the company’s controlling 
shareholders at the expense of its public investors, Google formed a special 
committee of independent directors to negotiate and approve the terms of the 
recapitalization.2 Furthermore, in the settlement of the litigation over the 
 
1 See Simon C.Y. Wong, Google’s Stock-Split Plan Would Replace Stewardship with Dictatorship, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 18, 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/04/googles-stock-split-plan-would [https://per
ma.cc/8UK4-PVCS]  (“[Google’s] recent proposal to effect a 2-for-1 stock split by issuing non-voting 
shares is an abhorrent idea . . . .”); see also Steven Davidoff Solomon, Thorny Side Effects in Silicon 
Valley Tactic to Keep Control, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2013, at B8 (“Google proposed last year that the 
company issue a new class of shares with no voting rights.”). 
2 See Paul Lee, Note, Protecting Public Shareholders: The Case of Google’s Recapitalization, 5 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 281, 284 (2015) (noting that the special committee of independent directors “negotiated 
certain protections” for other shareholders before voting on the plan). 
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recapitalization, Google’s independent directors were assigned an important 
ongoing role to enforce certain restrictions on the company’s founders.3 
If a company, like Google, has a controlling shareholder, a main concern of 
corporate law is to address potential conflicts of interest between the controller 
and public investors.4 Corporate law has long relied on oversight by independent 
directors—directors who have no ties to the controller or the company other than 
their service on the board—over corporate decisions where the interests of the 
controller substantially diverge from those of the company or its public investors 
(hereinafter “conflicted decisions”).5 Both courts and lawmakers have sought to 
use independent directors to safeguard against such controller opportunism.6 
As we explain in this Article, the existing arrangements for electing directors 
undermine the effectiveness of independent director oversight. Because these 
arrangements provide controllers with decisive power to appoint independent 
directors and decide whether to retain them, independent directors have 
significant incentives to side with the controller and insufficient countervailing 
incentives to protect public investors in conflicted decisions. Thus, independent 
directors currently relied upon to contain controllers’ conflicts cannot be 
expected to be effective guardians of public investors’ interests. 
We also show how the rules governing the appointment of independent 
directors could be refined to make their oversight more effective. To improve the 
effectiveness of independent directors in cases of controllers’ conflicts, some 
directors should be elected in ways that would make them at least somewhat 
accountable to public investors. These directors, which we call “enhanced-
independence directors,” should play a key role in approving self-dealing 
transactions. We develop a framework of alternative legal rules for obtaining 
enhanced independence without undermining the controller’s ability to 
determine business strategy in nonconflicted decisions. We also explain how 
 
3 See In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS, 2013 WL 5949928, at *2 (Del. 
Ch. Nov. 6, 2013) (incorporating the parties’ settlement agreement, which amended the Transfer 
Restriction Agreement to include that it could not be waived or modified without consideration and 
approval by a committee of at least two independent directors); see also Revised Stipulation of 
Compromise and Settlement at 8, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS, 2013 WL 
5949928 (Del. Ch. Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312514116
482/d699828dex404.htm? [https://perma.cc/K49D-BYJ8]. 
4 We analyze in detail the corporate governance problems of controlled companies in Lucian 
A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
1263 (2009) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Hamdani, Elusive Quest]. 
5 Drawing the line between ordinary business decisions and those that should be treated as conflicted 
decisions is a complicated task. See infra note 112. In this Article, we do not take a view on this question. 
6 While independent director oversight is widely accepted, some writers have expressed 
concerns about the extent to which independence is undermined by the power controllers have over 
independent directors. For such writings, see, for example, María Gutiérrez & Maribel Sáez, 
Deconstructing Independent Directors, 13 J. CORP. L. STUD. 63 (2013), and Donald C. Clarke, The 
Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125, 170-71 (2006). 
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courts, regulators, and investors could require or encourage companies to 
introduce enhanced-independence directors. 
Consider again the Google example. Suppose that minority shareholders had 
the right to elect, or at least veto the appointment of, two independent directors. 
Such enhanced-independence directors would have had greater incentives to 
resist a recapitalization plan that benefitted the controller at the expense of public 
investors. The approval of the plan by such independent directors would have 
been a more meaningful signal than approval by independent directors who serve 
only at the controller’s will. 
The enhanced-independence approach that we put forward can address 
longstanding dilemmas with which the Delaware courts have been wrestling.7 In 
well-known decisions involving freezeout transactions, Delaware courts have 
recognized the structural problems afflicting independent directors, choosing not 
to defer to the approval of freezeouts by such directors and, instead, to grant 
judicial deference only to transactions also approved by a majority vote of 
minority shareholders. Outside the freezeout context, however, the Delaware 
courts have not always followed such an approach, and some decisions have 
granted significant cleansing power to independent director approval in cases of 
controller conflicts.  
For example, Delaware courts substantially rely on independent directors to 
make decisions regarding derivative actions against the controller. Such judicial 
decisions might be due to concerns about the costs of alternatives. For courts 
influenced by such concerns, enhanced-independence directors can offer a 
workable alternative within the existing framework of corporate law doctrine. 
We do not argue in this Article that independent directors should play a key 
role in protecting public investors at controlled companies. Some may believe 
that market forces—such as reputation—will prevent controlling shareholders 
from expropriating public investors. Others may find other measures—such as 
public enforcement or approval by minority shareholders—to be necessary or 
effective in enhancing investor protection. This Article takes as a given that 
corporate law, both in the United States and in many countries around the world, 
has long relied substantially on independent directors in controlled companies to 
protect public investors in cases of controller conflicts. Given this pervasive 
reliance on independent directors, our contribution is twofold. First, we show 
that, by itself, approval by independent directors who serve at the pleasure of the 
controller cannot serve as an effective device for vetting conflicted decisions. 
 
7 For a more detailed account of the Delaware cases described in the text above, see discussion 
infra Section II.B. 
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Second, we analyze how to turn independent directors into more effective 
guardians of the interests of public investors in conflicted decisions.8 
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on controlled 
companies and independent directors. Controlled companies constitute a sizeable 
minority of large, publicly traded firms in the United States, including well-known 
companies such as Facebook, Google, News Corp, and Viacom. Controlled 
companies are even more prevalent outside the United States, dominating public 
capital markets in Europe and in most countries around the world. 
In widely held firms, the chief governance concern is to prevent professional 
managers from behaving opportunistically at the expense of investors. In 
controlled companies, by contrast, controllers have both the incentives and the 
power to police management, but they may use their power to divert value at 
the expense of public investors.9 In these companies, therefore, a primary 
governance concern is to protect public investors from controller opportunism 
and value diversion. Corporate law commonly addresses this concern by 
requiring or encouraging the use of independent directors and relying on such 
directors to vet self-dealing transactions and other conflicted decisions. 
Part II explains the fundamental shortcoming of this approach. Under 
existing arrangements, controlling shareholders normally play a decisive role in 
the appointment and retention of independent directors. Even independent 
directors, therefore, are inherently dependent on the controller for their 
election and retention as board members. This regime incentivizes independent 
directors to favor the controller, and it fails to provide them countervailing 
incentives to protect public investors. 
Learning from widely held firms reinforces our critique. The CEOs of such 
firms once wielded substantial influence over independent directors’ 
appointments. Today, however, there is widespread recognition that, to enable 
independent directors to monitor the CEO effectively, we should both limit the 
CEO’s influence over their appointments and make these directors accountable 
to public investors. This recognition underlies the litany of reforms focused on 
director elections at widely held firms, including placing director selection in the 
hands of nominating committees composed solely of independent directors, 
 
8 Our view is that a majority-of-the-minority vote can be a useful and effective tool in many 
contexts for guarding the interests of public investors. However, the question of when such a vote 
should be used in conjunction with or instead of enhanced-independence directors is outside the scope 
of this Article. In addition, we do not consider in this Article how to define self-dealing and other cases 
of controller conflicts. Nor do we discuss the proper test for deciding whether a company is controlled. 
The U.S. corporate law system has answers to these questions, as do other systems, and we take those 
as given for the purpose of our analysis. Finally, we do not consider in this Article when having a 
controlling shareholder is desirable; we take as given for the purposes of our analysis that some companies 
have a controlling shareholder that can shape the strategic direction of the company. 
9 See infra notes 17–21. 
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providing for majority voting, and enabling proxy access.10 If CEOs’ informal 
influence over the selection of independent directors compromises their ability 
to contain CEO opportunism, controlling shareholders’ absolute control over the 
appointment and retention of independent directors is all the more problematic. 
Part II concludes by introducing our proposed approach for making 
independent directors more effective guardians of the interests of public 
investors in controlled companies. Such companies, we argue, should have 
some directors who (i) lack the incentives produced by the controller’s 
decisive influence over the directors’ appointment and retention and (ii) have 
some incentives that flow from making the directors accountable to public 
investors. A regime of such enhanced-independence directors requires measures 
that will limit controllers’ power over the appointment of these directors 
while providing public investors with some degree of influence over this 
appointment. Such measures, we show, are not an ivory-tower idea without 
real-world precedent. The American Stock Exchange (AMEX) required 
them for dual-class companies that went public during a certain period, and 
they have been recently introduced in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Israel. 
Part III develops a framework for designing enhanced-independence rules 
with the desired balance between enhancing independence to limit controller 
opportunism and controllers’ legitimate interests in making business 
decisions. Public investors may participate in three stages of director elections: 
initial appointment, reelection, and termination. For each stage, we identify 
different degrees of public investors’ input rights and evaluate the impact of 
these rights on investor protection. Public investors, we argue, should at least 
have veto rights over the initial appointment, reelection, and termination of 
enhanced-independence directors. We also explain, however, that there are 
good reasons to consider going beyond veto rights—for example, by 
empowering public investors to determine whether enhanced-independence 
directors are reelected and terminated. 
Part IV focuses on the strategies for implementing an enhanced-independence 
approach. Regimes based on judge-made law, such as in Delaware, can encourage 
the use of enhanced-independence directors by according significant cleansing 
powers only to the approval of conflicted decisions by such directors. By 
contrast, regimes based on legislative or regulatory mandates can require the 
appointment of some enhanced-independence directors and the approval of 
certain conflicted decisions by such directors. 
We also discuss the desirable number and role of enhanced-independence 
directors. To protect public investors, these directors should play a dominant 
role in—and only in—vetting self-dealing transactions and other conflicted 
decisions. To preserve controllers’ ability to set the company’s business 
 
10 See infra notes 25–31, 49–50 and accompanying text. 
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strategy, however, such directors should not play a dominant role in other 
corporate affairs, and they should therefore not constitute a substantial 
fraction of the members of the board. 
Part V considers potential objections to an enhanced-independence approach. 
We address claims that enhanced-independence directors would be harmful by 
interfering with the controller’s ability to run the company, undermining the 
board’s collegiality and cohesiveness, or facilitating abuse by some opportunistic 
minority shareholders. We also consider claims that such directors would not add 
significantly to the protection of public investors. We show that these objections 
do not undermine the case for enhanced-independence directors. 
We shall use the terms “minority shareholders” or “public investors” to refer 
to shareholders other than the controller. We note that these shareholders 
sometimes hold a majority of the equity capital. This is likely to be the case when 
a dual-class structure, or another aspect of the corporate structure, separates 
voting rights from cash flow rights and enables the controller to retain a lock on 
control while holding a minority, even a small minority, of the company’s equity.11 
A substantial body of evidence suggests that the risk of value diversion increases 
when controllers use dual-class or other ownership structures for separating cash 
flow rights from votes.12 Thus, even those who would not support enhanced-
independence directors for controlled companies in general should consider 
using them for dual-class companies and other structures that separate voting and 
cash flow rights. 
I. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND CONTROLLED COMPANIES 
This Part sets the background for our analysis of director independence at 
controlled companies. Section A describes the prevalence of concentrated 
ownership and the governance challenges that this ownership structure creates. 
 
11 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: 
The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights (examining ownership 
structures where a controlling shareholder retains a small fraction of the firm’s cash flow rights), in 
CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295, 297-301 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000). Examining 
whether and to what extent structures that separate cash flow rights from voting rights are desirable 
is beyond the scope of this Article, and we take the existence of companies with such structures as 
given for the purposes of our analysis. For a recent contribution to the debate on dual-class firms 
co-authored by one of us, see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for 
Perpetual Dual-Class Stock (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., 
Discussion Paper No. 905, 2017; Harvard Law Sch. Program on Corp. Governance, Discussion Paper 
No. 2017-6, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954630 [https://perma.cc/8H6E-ZVAE]. 
12 For empirical evidence on the link between controllers’ wedge between cash flow and voting 
rights and agency costs, see Marianne Bertrand et al., Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application to Indian 
Business Groups, 117 Q. J. ECON. 121 (2002), Paul A. Gompers et al., Extreme Governance: An Analysis of 
Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051 (2010), and Chen Lin et al., Ownership 
Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2011). 
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Section B discusses corporate law’s reliance on independent directors to guard 
public investors’ interests. 
A. Preventing Controller Opportunism 
Controlled companies are important both in the United States and around 
the world. In the United States, they constitute a sizeable minority of large, 
publicly traded firms.13 As of December 31, 2016, there were 379 Russell 3000 
companies with a shareholder holding more than 30% of the company’s voting 
shares, and 220 of these companies had one shareholder holding more than 50% 
of such shares.14 Controlled companies are even more prevalent outside the 
United States. Public companies in Europe, Asia, and Latin America 
commonly have a controlling shareholder.15 
The governance challenges at controlled companies are fundamentally 
different from those at widely held companies.16 At widely held companies, the 
fundamental governance problem arises from the divergence of interests between 
managers and investors, and so corporate law and governance arrangements aim 
to address managerial agency costs. By contrast, the fundamental governance 
problem in controlled companies concerns the agency problems between 
controllers and public investors.  
Controlling shareholders own a significant fraction of the firm’s cash-flow 
rights, which gives them a substantial incentive to police management and 
 
13 See Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: 
Evidence from the S&P 500, 58 J. FIN. 1301, 1302 (2003) (observing that roughly 35% of S&P 500 companies 
have families as dominant shareholders); Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the 
United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1378 (2009) (presenting evidence that “raise[s] doubts about 
whether ownership in the United States’ [public firms] is . . . less concentrated than elsewhere”). 
14 This data was collected from Factset and ORBIS databases, and was supplemented by information 
from public filings on the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR). 
15 For empirical research documenting that concentrated ownership is prevalent around the 
world, see M. BECHT & C. MAYER, Introduction to THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE 1, 4-7 
(Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht eds., 2001); Stijn Claessens et al., The Separation of Ownership and 
Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 110 (2000); Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, 
The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 378 (2002); and Rafael 
La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 511 (1999). 
16 See generally Bebchuk & Hamdani, Elusive Quest, supra note 4. 
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enhance the company’s value.17 Controllers, however, may also use their power 
to divert value at the expense of the company and its public investors.18  
Such diversion could take many forms, including selling (or purchasing) 
assets, goods, or services to (or from) the company they control on terms that 
favor them;19 acquiring equity at below-market prices from either the company 
or public investors in a freezeout transaction;20 or paying excessive compensation 
to the controller or family members.21 In controlled companies, therefore, 
corporate law and governance arrangements should protect public investors from 
the controllers’ value diversion.22 
B. The Reliance on Independent Directors 
A common approach for containing controllers’ conflict is to rely on 
independent directors. Legal regimes in the United States and around the 
world require or encourage companies to appoint independent directors and 
assign them the task of approving self-dealing and other conflicted decisions. 
1. The United States 
Independent directors are an important feature of U.S. boardrooms. As 
Jeff Gordon has documented, the number of independent directors has 
 
17 See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1651 (2006) (“[A] controlling shareholder may police 
the management of public corporations better than the standard panoply of market-oriented 
techniques employed when shareholdings are widely held.”); see also Jens Dammann, The Controlling 
Shareholder’s General Duty of Care: A Dogma That Should Be Abandoned, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 479, 481 
(noting controlling shareholders “have strong financial incentives to make informed decisions in the 
best interest of their corporations”). 
18 Such extraction is often referred to as “tunneling.” See Vladimir Atanasov et al., Law and 
Tunneling, 37 J. Corp. L. 1, 2 (2011). For a review of different methods of tunneling and self-dealing, 
see id. at 3, which identifies three general types of tunneling: cash flow, asset, and equity. 
19 For empirical studies on diversion via related-party transactions, see Kee-Hong Bae et al., 
Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups, 57 J. FIN. 2695, 2698 
(2002), and Guohua Jiang et al., Tunneling Through Intercorporate Loans: The China Experience, 98 J. 
FIN. ECON. 1, 2 (2010). 
20 For empirical studies on diversion via equity transactions, see, for example, Jae-Seung Baek 
et al., Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols, 61 J. 
FIN. 2415, 2418-19 (2006), and Borja Larrain & Francisco Urzúa I., Controlling Shareholders and Market 
Timing in Share Issuance, 109 J. FIN. ECON. 661, 661-62 (2013). 
21 For empirical evidence on value diversion through excessive compensation to controlling 
families, see Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Controlling Stockholders and the Disciplinary Role of 
Corporate Payout Policy: A Study of the Times Mirror Company, 56 J. FIN. ECON. 153, 154-56 (2000). 
22 See Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 117, 117 (2007) (“[C]oncentrated ownership can create conditions for a new agency 
problem, because the interests of controlling and minority shareholders are not aligned.”). 
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increased dramatically over time because of both judicial encouragement and 
federal mandates.23 
At the federal level, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)24 and the 
applicable stock exchange listing standards require that boards of widely held 
companies have a majority of independent directors.25 These directors are 
responsible for key issues that might entail a conflict of interest between 
shareholders and management, such as executive compensation,26 appointment 
of auditors,27 and certain nomination decisions.28 Federal rules adopt a laxer 
approach to director independence at controlled companies.29 While these 
companies are still subject to the independent audit committee requirements, 
they are not required to have a majority of their directors be independent,30 
and they are exempt from the independent compensation and nomination 
committee requirements.31 
State corporate law has used standards of judicial review to encourage 
companies to appoint independent directors and assign them a meaningful role 
 
23 See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950− 2005: 
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007) [hereinafter Gordon, The 
Rise of Independent Directors]. 
24 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6) (2012). 
25 See Developments in the Law—Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2169, 2187 (2004) 
(“The revised listing standards of both the NYSE and NASDAQ . . . require (with a few exceptions) 
that listed-company boards have a majority of independent directors . . . .”). 
26 See NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 303A.05(a) (2017), http://nysemanual.
nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm
-sections%2F [https://perma.cc/6PRM-4SVJ] [hereinafter NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL] 
(requiring a compensation committee consisting solely of independent directors); see also NASDAQ, 
STOCK MKT. INC., MARKETPLACE RULES R. 4350(c)(3)(A)–(B) (2017), https://www.sec.gov/rules/
other/nasdaqllcf1a4_5/nasdaqllcamendrules4000.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWV3-WUW5] [hereinafter 
NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES] (requiring active involvement of either a wholly independent 
compensation committee or a majority of independent directors). 
27 See Developments in the Law—Corporations and Society, supra note 25, at 2191 (2004) (“Each 
exchange mandates that listed companies create an audit committee . . . and every member must meet 
. . . rigorous independence requirements . . . .”). 
28 See, e.g., NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES, supra note 26, R. 4350(c)(4)(A) (requiring active 
involvement in director nomination of either a wholly independent nomination committee or a 
majority of independent directors). 
29 See generally NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 26, § 303A.00 (stating that 
controlled companies are not required to comply with the independent-director provisions of the 
manual); see also NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES, supra note 26, R. 4350(c)(5) (defining a “controlled 
company” as “a company of which more than 50% of the voting power [for the election of directors] is 
held by an individual, a group or another company”). 
30 See SEC Approves NYSE and NASDAQ Proposals Relating to Director Independence, FINDLAW, 
http://corporate.findlaw.com/finance/sec-approves-nyse-and-nasdaq-proposals-relating-to-direct
or.html [https://perma.cc/6REH-6P39] (undated) (discussing recently approved standards for 
independent directors for controlled companies on stock exchanges). 
31 See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 26, § 303A.00 (exempting controlled 
companies from the nominating-committee provisions and the compensation-committee provisions of 
the manual). 
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in vetting transactions involving conflicts of interest.32 Delaware courts, for 
example, have used the entire fairness standard to review certain self-dealing 
transactions involving controlling shareholders. Whereas the business judgment 
rule substantially insulates a transaction from judicial scrutiny,33 the entire 
fairness standard requires the defendants to prove that the transaction was fair 
to public investors by showing a fair process and a fair price.34 The active 
involvement of an effective, empowered special negotiation committee consisting 
solely of independent directors, however, can significantly alleviate the burden 
that defendants face.35 
2. Around the World 
Other countries are also increasingly viewing independent directors as 
essential to protecting public investors at controlled companies. Accordingly, 
these countries have adopted one or more of the following arrangements.36 First, 
 
32 See Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 23, at 1523-26 (reviewing the role 
that Delaware courts played in encouraging public companies to give more power to independent 
directors); Steven M. Haas, Note, Toward a Controlling Shareholder Safe Harbor, 90 VA. L. REV. 2245, 
2250-70 (2004) (reviewing case law on Delaware’s changing standard of review for self-dealing 
transactions approved by independent directors). 
33 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1346-47 (Del. Ch. 1981) (discussing the 
business judgment exercised by the board and finding that this shielded it), rev’d, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 
1983); see also Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (describing the business 
judgment rule as “deferential”). 
34 See, e.g., Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1239 (Del. 2012) (explaining that the 
standard of review for controlling-shareholder transactions is entire fairness and the burden falls on 
the defendant). 
35 Such involvement can shift the burden for showing fairness back to the plaintiff. See, e.g., 
Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (stating that “approval of the 
transaction by either an independent committee of directors or a[] . . . majority of the minority 
shareholders shifts the burden” in entire fairness review from the interested party to the challenging 
party). In some cases, the use of both an independent special negotiating committee and approval 
by a majority of the minority shareholders will prevent Delaware courts from engaging in an entire 
fairness review. See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 642-44 (Del. 2014) (adopting the 
lower court’s ruling that the presence of both procedural safeguards for minority shareholders—an 
independent committee of directors and a majority of the minority vote—leads to application of the 
business judgment rule). 
36 In 2005, the European Commission recommended that member states adopt governance 
standards that require directors to be independent of controlling shareholders. See Commission 
Recommendation 2005/162/EC of 15 Feb. 2005, 2005 O.J. (L 52) 52, 63, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-cont
ent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32005H0162&from=EN [http://perma.cc/X4B8-QM4M] (recommending 
“[t]he presence of independent representatives on the board, capable of challenging the decisions of 
management,” and describing what such independence entails). However, some countries’ definitions 
of independence overlook ties between directors and controllers. See, for example, the German 
approach described in Paul Davies et al., Boards in Law and Practice: A Cross-Country Analysis in Europe, 
in CORPORATE BOARDS IN LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN EUROPE 30 & n.120 
(Paul Davies et al. eds., 2013), submitting that “in Europe, independent directors are being used for the 
wrong purposes.” See also Gutiérrez & Sáez, supra note 6, at 74-75 (noting that “European jurisdictions 
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public company boards are expected to include some fraction of independent 
directors. Second, independent directors must serve on committees that play an 
active role in monitoring management and controlling shareholders. Third, many 
countries specifically require that independent directors play an active role in 
scrutinizing self-dealing transactions. Below we review some examples of the 
increasing reliance on independent directors to police controlling shareholders. 
In Europe, independent directors are often expected, if not required, to serve 
on the corporation’s audit committee, and they often constitute a significant 
fraction of the audit committee’s members.37 Japan, India, Korea, and Russia have 
adopted similar requirements.38 In Brazil, Japan, and some European countries, 
independent directors play an important role in nomination and remuneration 
committees.39 Their presence on the audit, compensation, and nomination 
committees provides them with better access to information and the means to 
monitor value diversion by controlling shareholders.40 
Some countries specifically require that independent directors play an active 
role in the vetting of related-party transactions in controlled companies.41 In 
 
have failed to make [the] distinction” between “independent directors in corporations with 
concentrated ownership” and independent directors in other corporations). 
37 Some countries (such as Germany) require the appointment of only one independent 
director. Guido Ferrarini & Marilena Filippelli, Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders 
Around the World 23 & n.25 (European Corp. Governance Inst. (ECGI), Working Paper No. 
258/2014, May 2014). Others require a majority or two-thirds of independent members. Id. at 23-24, 
n.26. Still others require that all members of the committee be independent. Id. at 24, n.27. 
38 For studies discussing such requirements in various jurisdictions, see Donald C. Clarke, 
Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 99-102 (2007); A.C. Pritchard, 
Monitoring of Corporate Groups by Independent Directors, 9 J. KOREAN L. 1, 16 (2009); Colleen R. 
Stumpf, Comment, Diverse Economies—Same Problems: The Struggle for Corporate Governance Reform 
in Russia and the United States, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 897, 908 (2006); and Umakanth Varottil, 
Evolution and Effectiveness of Independent Directors in Indian Corporate Governance, 6 HASTINGS BUS. 
L.J. 281, 308-21 (2010). 
39 See, e.g., Roberto Barontini et al., Directors’ Remuneration Before and After the Crisis: Measuring 
the Impact of Reforms in Europe (analyzing “the impact of recent reforms,” including those related to 
independence in remuneration practices, “on directors’ remuneration”), in BOARDS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS IN EUROPEAN LISTED COMPANIES: FACTS, CONTEXT AND POST-CRISIS 
REFORMS 251 (Massimo Belcredi & Guido Ferrarini eds., 2013). 
40 See Paul Krüger Andersen & Dorthe Kristensen Balshøj, Directors’ Conflicts of Interests: A 
Contribution to European Convergence (describing the value of independent directors on such 
committees), in BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IN EUROPEAN COMPANIES: RESHAPING AND 
HARMONISING THEIR ORGANISATION AND DUTIES 63-74 (Hanne S. Birkmose, Mette Neville & 
Karsten Engsig Sørensen eds., 2013). 
41 See Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Related Party Transactions (discussing how major 
jurisdictions regulate related-party transactions, including “Japan and much of continental Europe,” 
which “mandate approval by disinterested board members”), in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE 
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 101, 105-09, 128-30 (Reinier Kraakman et al. 
eds., 2004) (discussing how major jurisdictions regulate related party transactions). 
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Italy, for instance, significant related-party transactions require the approval of 
an independent committee of the board.42 
II. THE LIMITS OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
Empowering independent directors to review self-dealing and other 
conflicted decisions might offer public investors at controlled companies 
some degree of protection. For example, the incentives of directors to go 
along with the preferences of the controller might be less powerful when they 
have no ties to the controller other than through their service on the board. 
Indeed, academic studies on reforms in Korea, Taiwan, India, China, and 
other countries provide evidence suggesting that the appointment of 
independent directors at controlled firms can enhance share value.43 
In this Part, we argue that independent directors in controlled companies 
still have incentives to favor controllers, which undermine their effectiveness 
in overseeing controller conflicts. For independent directors to vet conflicted 
decisions well, they should have adequate incentives to do so. However, the 
prevailing regime that governs director elections provides independent 
directors with incentives to favor controlling shareholders and with few 
countervailing incentives to protect public investors from self-dealing and 
other forms of value diversion. 
We would like to clarify at the outset that we do not argue that directors are 
exclusively motivated by their desire to get elected or reelected to the board. 
Directors’ sense of professionalism and integrity, and fiduciary duties and 
norms, may have significant influence on how directors act. Yet corporate law 
has chosen, and we believe correctly, not to rely exclusively on such factors. If 
we could exclusively rely on them, many key corporate law rules as well as 
financial incentive schemes would be unnecessary. 
 
42 See Guido Ferrarini et al., Corporate Boards in Italy (describing measures regarding related-party 
transactions required by the Italian Civil Code), in CORPORATE BOARDS IN LAW AND PRACTICE: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN EUROPE, supra note 36, at 367, 400-05. 
43 For empirical studies suggesting that introducing independent directors benefitted public 
investors in various countries, see Bernard S. Black & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Can Corporate 
Governance Reforms Increase Firm Market Values? Event Study Evidence from India, 4 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 749, 751 (2007); Bernard Black & Woochan Kim, The Effect of Board Structure on Firm 
Value: A Multiple Identification Strategies Approach Using Korean Data, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 203, 225 
(2012); Jay Dahya et al., Dominant Shareholders, Corporate Boards, and Corporate Value: A Cross-Country 
Analysis, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 73, 75 (2008); and Yin-Hua Yeh & Tracie Woidtke, Commitment or 
Entrenchment?: Controlling Shareholders and Board Composition, 29 J. BANKING & FIN. 1857, 1862-63 
(2005). For a study finding that firms with high percentages of independent directors tend to “have 
a smaller magnitude of manipulated transfer prices,” see Agnes W.Y. Lo et al., Can Corporate 
Governance Deter Management from Manipulating Earnings? Evidence from Related-Party Sales 
Transactions in China, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 225, 226 (2010). 
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Section A explains how recent developments concerning director independence 
at widely held firms should inform our assessment of controlled companies. In 
Section B, we discuss the structural incentives of independent directors at 
controlled companies. In Section C, we turn to examine how to make independent 
director oversight more effective. 
A. Learning from Widely Held Firms 
At widely held companies, director independence reinforces the 
accountability created by public investors’ right to elect directors. Although 
lawmakers and investors had focused on regulating director independence, 
they have increasingly adopted reforms that enhance public investors’ role in 
director elections. 
Public investors at widely held companies have the power to elect 
members to the board. This power arguably makes directors accountable to 
shareholders and incentivizes members of the board to keep shareholders 
satisfied with their performance.44 In fact, courts have relied on shareholders’ 
ability to displace underperforming directors as a reason for deferring to 
directors’ business decisions.45 
Independence requirements strengthen these market incentives by 
ensuring that directors have no conflicts that could undermine their 
effectiveness as monitors of management.46 For example, a director whose 
livelihood depends on her business ties with the company might fear that 
refusing to accept the CEO pay demands would provoke retaliation. Many 
investors and lawmakers, however, believe that such independence alone may 
not ensure directors’ accountability because management’s influence over the 
appointment of directors can also undermine the effectiveness of those 
directors as monitors. Even an independent director might fear that adopting 
a skeptical approach toward the CEO, for example, would reduce her chances 
of reappointment. Moreover, to the extent that the CEO is involved in 
appointment decisions, directors may develop a sense of gratitude and 
 
44 But see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 688-94 
(2007) (discussing the impediments to electoral challenges even when shareholder discontent with the 
board actions and decisions are significant). 
45 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“The 
redress for [directors’] failures . . . must come . . . through the action of shareholders . . . and not 
from this Court.”); see also Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Nev. 1997) 
(“One of the justifications for the business judgment rule’s insulation of directors from liability . . . 
is that unhappy shareholders can always vote the directors out of office.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Shoen v. AMERCO, 885 F. Supp. 1332, 1340 (D. Nev. 1994))).  
46 See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 26, § 303A.02; NASDAQ MARKETPLACE 
RULES, supra note 26, R. 5605(2). 
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obligation to accommodate the CEO’s preferences.47 These concerns underlie 
the post-Enron requirement that independent directors control the board 
nomination process, thereby taking from managers the formal power to 
influence the process—and thus the outcome—of director elections.48 
Proposed reforms have gradually gone beyond director independence and 
extended to measures that enhance public investors’ influence over director 
election. The majority voting regime for electing directors, for example, 
makes it easier for shareholders to prevent the company’s candidates from 
joining the board.49 Commentators and activist shareholders have called for 
additional reforms that would give a majority of shareholders the power to 
elect and fire directors. These include providing shareholders with access to 
the ballot and dismantling staggered boards.50 
These developments offer two important lessons for controlled companies. 
First, controllers’ absolute control over the election of independent directors 
undermines those directors’ effectiveness as monitors. Second, enabling public 
investors to influence the election of independent directors would provide these 
directors with incentives to guard public investors’ interests. 
B. Director Independence at Controlled Firms 
At controlled companies, independent directors are expected to exercise 
oversight to prevent the controller from expropriating value from public 
investors. Yet, the same election method that holds directors accountable to 
 
47 See, e.g., Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board 
Members: An Empirical Analysis, 54 J. FIN. 1829, 1851 (1999) (observing that “when CEOs are involved 
in director selection, companies choose new directors who are less likely to monitor aggressively”). 
48 See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 26, § 303A.04(a) (“Listed companies 
must have a nominating/corporate governance committee composed entirely of independent 
directors.”); see also Michael E. Murphy, The Nominating Process for Corporate Boards of Directors: A 
Decision-Making Analysis, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 131, 148 (2008) (noting that “NYSE rules . . . require 
the nominating committee to be composed entirely of independent directors”). 
49 For reviews of majority voting regimes, see Stephen J. Choi et al., Does Majority Voting Improve 
Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1127 (2016), which notes that “[m]any commentators 
have argued that majority voting enhances director accountability to shareholders,” and William K. 
Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 463 
(2007), which explains how majority voting “affords shareholders, in effect, veto power over managements’ 
candidates.” Vanguard, for instance, has emphasized majority voting in its company engagements. See Our 
Governance and Executive Compensation Principles, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard 
-proxy-voting/corporate-governance [https://perma.cc/D5JL-QVG7HRMZ-4SQK] (stating that “directors 
should be subject to annual elections by majority vote”). 
50 The proxy access reform allows certain shareholders to include their own nominees on the 
company’s ballot. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 
BUS. LAW. 43, 47 (2003) (arguing that proxy access is a moderate step toward improving board 
accountability); Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 211 (2005) (identifying proxy-access bylaws as a way of challenging 
management control of the board of directors). 
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public investors at widely held companies currently also holds them 
accountable to the controller at controlled companies. Controlling shareholders 
have decisive power over director appointment. Directors at firms with 
controlling shareholders—including independent directors—cannot be elected 
or reelected following their initial term—unless the controlling shareholder 
supports their candidacies. Nor will they stay in office once the controlling 
shareholder decides to end their service on the board.51 
This regime provides directors with substantial incentives to keep the 
controller satisfied. And incentives aside, social norms often lead individuals 
who are placed in a position by a given individual to feel some sense of 
gratitude toward that individual.52 The existing election regime also fails to 
provide independent directors with adequate countervailing incentives to 
protect public investors. Independent directors do not owe their service on 
the board to public investors, who can neither elect them nor remove them 
from office. If the controller so wishes, these directors would serve on the 
board even if a majority of public investors would be happy to see them leave. 
Directors’ initial election and retention solely depend on the controller. 
There have been extreme cases in which controllers made explicit threats 
to fire independent directors that did not go along with their wishes.53 And 
while such instances highlight the undesirable incentives produced by the 
controller’s power over director election, we should stress that such incentives 
exist even when the controller makes no such threat. A well-lawyered 
controller would likely cite other reasons when removing a director that 
resists the controller’s wishes. Even without explicit threats, directors’ 
structural dependence is always present. 
Delaware courts have long expressed concerns about the potential 
dependence of all directors in controlled companies on controllers.54 Yet, as 
 
51 The authority to remove a director generally lies with shareholders, though some states allow 
for the board to remove one of its members under certain conditions. See, e.g., NEW YORK BUSINESS 
CORPORATION LAW § 706(a) (specifying conditions under which a director may be removed by 
action of the board). While removing a director during her term in office may be burdensome, as it 
requires a special shareholder meeting, the controller can simply decide not to nominate a director 
for another term. 
52 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 80-83 (2006) (arguing that CEO influence on the 
appointment of independent directors might lead to their having a sense of obligation and loyalty 
toward the CEO that can contribute to a tendency to go along with CEO pay wishes). 
53 See, e.g., In re Dole Food Co., Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 8703, 2015 WL 5052214, at *13-15 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015) (describing threats that a controlling shareholder made against a director 
who opposed a transaction proposed by the controller). 
54 See, e.g., In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., No. 9962, 2016 WL 
301245, at *41 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016) (“[D]elaware decisions have long worried about a controller’s 
potential ability to take retributive action against outside directors if they did not support the 
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explained below, the Delaware courts have yet to fully recognize the scope 
and implications of this structural dependence. 
In the context of freezeout transactions, courts have concluded that approval 
by a special committee of independent directors does not suffice to eliminate 
the need for judicial review.55 In doing so, they have explained their reluctance 
to grant full cleansing power to such a committee by expressly invoking 
controlling shareholders’ decisive power to appoint independent directors. In an 
influential article, then–Vice Chancellor Leo Strine analogized the controller to 
“an 800-pound gorilla [that] wants the rest of the bananas” and the independent 
directors to “little chimpanzees” who “cannot be expected to stand in the way, 
even if the gorilla putatively gives them veto power.”56 
Outside the freezeout context, however, Delaware courts have stopped 
short of adopting a similar approach to independent director approval. For 
example, although derivative suits against the controller involve a significant 
divergence of interest between the controller and public investors, Delaware 
courts defer to independent directors’ decisions about the fate of these 
derivative actions.57 In the seminal Aronson case, the court held that for 
plaintiffs to establish the futility of making a demand on the board to sue the 
controller, “it is not enough to charge that a director was nominated by or 
elected at the behest of those controlling the outcome of a corporate election.”58  
Delaware courts have relied on decisions of special litigation committees 
consisting of independent directors to dismiss claims against controlling 
shareholders.59 Some Delaware decisions have also displayed deference to 
compensation arrangements between public companies and their controllers that 
 
controller’s chosen transaction and whether it could cause them to support a deal that was not in the 
best interests of the company or its stockholders.”). 
55 See, e.g., Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 642 (Del. 2014) (noting that approval 
by a Special Committee “of a merger with a buying controlling stockholder” only shifts the burden of 
proof under the entire fairness standard). 
56 Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations, 27 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 509 (2002); see also In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 436 
(Del. Ch. 2002) (using the same analogy). 
57 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984). 
58 Id.; see also Friedman v. Dolan, No. 9425, 2015 WL 4040806, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) 
(stating that “[t]he mere fact that one [director] was appointed by a controller” does not suffice to 
overcome the presumption of her independence); Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, 
Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1051 (Del. 2004) (holding that ninety-four percent voting power was 
not enough to create reasonable doubt of independence). 
It is worth noting that, in a recent opinion, Vice Chancellor Laster insightfully highlighted the 
tension between the Aronson line of cases and the recognition in other cases that structural incentives 
afflict director decisions. See Ezcorp, 2016 WL 301245, at *90-91. 
59 See Pompeo v. Hefner, 1983 WL 20284, at *1-2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 1983) (holding that, by itself, 
the appointment of the sole member of a special litigation committee by the controller-defendant does 
not automatically require judicial scrutiny such director’s independence); see also Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 
A.2d 1148, 1164, 1165 n.41 (Del. Ch. 2003) (reiterating this point). 
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were approved by a special committee of independent directors.60 In other cases 
involving controller conflicts, Delaware court decisions have been mixed. Some 
court decisions granted substantial cleansing power to independent director 
approval while other decisions declined to do so.61 
To be sure, Delaware courts have often examined whether directors had 
some additional ties that provided them with incentives to go along with the 
controller. For example, Delaware courts have declined to defer to 
independent directors who co-owned a plane with the controller,62 who 
provided consulting services to the controller,63 or who served as an employee 
of a company over which the controller had considerable influence.64 We 
agree that such ties might strengthen the incentives of directors to go along 
with the wishes of the controller. However, our key point is that, even without 
such additional ties to the controller, service on the controlled company’s 
board produces by itself a structural incentives problem. 
Independent directors whose service on the board fully depends on the 
controller do not have adequate incentives to guard the interests of public 
investors in the face of controllers’ conflicts. Using Leo Strine’s metaphor, if 
independent directors cannot be expected in the freezeout context to oppose 
the big gorilla when it seeks the rest of the bananas, we should not expect 
them to resist the big gorilla when it pursues a peach, a mango, or any other 
fruit that it might fancy. Thus, we argue, courts and lawmakers should not 
 
60 See Friedman, 2015 WL 4040806, at *5-8 (applying the business judgment rule to the 
determination of executive pay and noting that “[e]ntire fairness is not the default standard for 
compensation awarded by an independent board or committee, even when a controller is at the helm 
of the company”); In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 587-88 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (applying the business judgment rule to dismiss a claim about a consulting contract with a 
member of the controlling family). 
61 For a systematic and careful review of cases going in different directions, see Vice Chancellor 
Laster’s opinion for the court in Ezcorp, 2016 WL 301245, at *12-15. Vice Chancellor Laster’s analysis 
highlights the structural incentives that independent directors in controlled companies have, id. at 
*16, and we hope that his analysis will prove influential. 
62 See Sandys v. Pincus, No. 157,2016, 2016 WL 7094027, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 2016) (noting that 
co-ownership of a private plane “is suggestive of the type of very close personal relationship that, like 
family ties, one would expect to heavily influence a human’s ability to exercise impartial judgment”). 
63 See In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *34 
(Del. Ch. June 4, 2004) (finding a lack of independence when a director provided and was 
compensated for financial advisory services to the controlled company). 
64 See Del. Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Sanchez, 124 A.3d 1017, 1019 (Del. 2015) (holding that a 
director was not independent of controller when he had a close friendship of over half a century with 
the controller and his primary employment was as an executive of a company over which the controller 
had substantial influence); see also In re Orchard Enters., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 21, 26 (Del. 
Ch. 2014) (holding that the question of a director’s independence created issues of fact for trial when 
the director had a close relationship and expected future employment with the controller); In re Loral 
Space & Commc’ns Inc., 2008 WL 4293781, at *20-21 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2008) (finding a lack of 
independence when a director had a long-standing relationship with the controller and solicited an 
investment from the controller during the special committee negotiations). 
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grant substantial cleansing power to decisions made by independent directors 
who serve on the board at the controller’s pleasure.65 
C. Toward Enhanced Independence 
Legal systems that substantially rely on independent directors to vet conflicted 
decisions, we argue, should weaken their incentives to favor the controller and 
provide them with affirmative incentives to protect public investors. Weakening 
directors’ incentives to favor controlling shareholders requires measures that 
would limit the controller’s power to appoint and terminate directors. Providing 
directors with affirmative incentives to protect public investors requires that the 
latter have a say in director election and termination. 
In the next Part, we develop a conceptual framework that can guide 
policymakers who wish to turn independent directors into effective monitors 
of controllers without undermining controllers’ ability to run their companies. 
As we explain below,66 one could take power away from the controller without 
giving any power to public investors. The approach we find best, however, is to 
grant public investors at least some power over director election and 
termination, as this power is vital for providing directors with affirmative 
incentives to protect public investors. 
We do not suggest that public investors have power to influence the 
election of all directors or even all independent directors. Rather, we believe 
that the election of some directors—enhanced-independence directors—should 
not be dictated by the controller. The controller should retain the power to 
appoint a majority of board members and run the company through its 
representatives on the board. Enhanced-independence directors should play 
an active role when a conflict arises between the interests of the controller 
and those of public investors. At the very least, public investors should have 
the right to veto the controller’s candidates for an enhanced-independence 
director position. As we explain below, however, public investors should wield 
even greater influence over these directors’ election. 
Before discussing our framework in detail, we should note that several 
legal regimes—one of them with our active involvement—have adopted 
reforms in the direction that we advocate. Below we discuss the regimes 
adopted by the AMEX stock exchange in the United States, Italy, the United 
Kingdom, and Israel. Because each of these regimes provided public investors 
 
65 We do not discuss the claim, which is beyond the scope of this Article, that approval by 
independent directors, despite its limitations, might provide public investors with some protection 
and should therefore assist the controller in some way in defending against challenge to a conflicted 
decision. Our focus is on showing that any significant deference now accorded to such approval by 
independent directors should be reserved only for approval by enhanced-independence directors. 
66 See infra Section IV.D. 
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with rights to influence the selection of independent directors, they suggest 
that the use of such directors is not merely an “ivory tower” idea but a 
practical real-world option. 
AMEX: In 1976, when the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) did not 
allow companies to use the dual-class share structure, AMEX decided to allow 
dual-class companies to list on the exchange subject to certain guidelines. 
These AMEX guidelines required that shares with inferior voting rights 
(normally, public investors) have the power to elect at least one quarter of the 
board.67 Although these AMEX requirements have not been in effect since the 
mid-1980s, a recent study found twenty-six dual-class companies, including 
The New York Times and Dillard, with a governance structure that complies 
with this AMEX requirement.68 
Italy: Controlled companies dominate Italy.69 Italian law requires public 
companies to provide public investors with the power to elect at least one 
member to the board.70 Companies must use the slate system for electing 
directors:71 Shareholders who meet minimum shareholding criteria may 
submit their own slate to compete against the company’s slate.72 Whereas the 
candidates who obtain the highest number of votes are elected, at least one 
director is elected from the minority slate that receives the most votes.73 A 
2013 study found that minority slates were submitted in forty percent of 
director elections.74 
United Kingdom: In response to a growing number of listings by controlled 
firms, in 2014 the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority adopted new 
 
67 See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote 
Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 704 n.90 (1986) (“The limited voting class of the common 
must have the ability—voting as a class—to elect not less than 25% of the board of directors.”). 
68 See Kobi Kastiel, Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled Companies, 2016 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 60, 92, 126-27, 127 n.212 (2016) (noting that twenty-six Delaware dual-class firms had 
proportional voting for directors in 2012, including the New York Times Company and Dillard’s, Inc.). 
69 Massimo Belcredi & Luca Enriques, Institutional Investor Activism in a Context of Concentrated 
Ownership and High Private Benefits of Control: The Case of Italy 4 (European Corp. Governance Inst. 
(ECGI), Working Paper No. 22/2013, 2014) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2325421 
[https://perma.cc/TKA7-TMZ7]. 
70 See id. at 8 (describing that “minority shareholders’ power to . . . have at least one [director] 
candidate appointed” as a “peculiar feature of current Italian corporate governance regulation”). 
71 See id. (describing the introduction and operation of slate voting in Italy); see also Ferrarini 
et al., supra note 42, at 392-93 (reviewing slate voting in Italy, which requires “at least one director 
[to] be elected from the minority slate of directors”). 
72 The percentage ownership required to submit a slate cannot exceed 2.5% of outstanding 
shares. Barontini et al., supra note 39, at 381. 
73 This holds true “provided that [the minority slate] has no link—even indirect—with the 
majority slate.” Ferrarini et al., supra note 42, at 392. 
74 See Barontini et al., supra note 39, at 389. For a systematic analysis documenting the effect 
of this election regime on directors’ dissent in the boardroom, see Piergaetano Marchetti et al., 
Dissenting Directors (European Corp. Governance Inst. (ECGI), Working Paper No. 332/2016, 2016). 
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listing rules aimed at improving investor protection in premium-listed controlled 
companies.75 This rule requires a dual-voting structure for the election and 
reelection of independent directors in controlled companies.76 Under this regime, 
the independent director’s election or reelection requires approval by both a 
majority of shareholders and a majority of minority shareholders.77 
Israel: Finally, Israeli corporate law requires public companies to have at least 
two “external directors” on their boards.78 These directors, who must be 
independent of the controlling shareholder, serve for three years and can be 
reelected to two additional three-year terms.79 While public investors do not have 
the power to elect these directors, they hold veto rights over their election.80 
Moreover, based on the recommendations of a committee in which we took part, 
a recent amendment provides public investors with the power to reelect an 
“external director” to the board even against the controller’s objection.81 
 
75 See Fin. Conduct Auth., Listing Rules (Listing Regime Enhancements) Instrument 2014, FCA 
2014/33, at 12, https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/instrument/2014/FCA_2014_33.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8XCU-2N3D] [hereinafter Listing Rules Instrument 2014] (“[The rules are] intended to ensure that 
the protections afforded to holders of equity shares by the premium listing requirements are 
meaningful.” (emphases omitted)). For a review of these rules, see generally Simon Witty et al., 
Enhancing the Effectiveness of The UK Listing Regime—Implementation, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 1, 2014), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/06/01/enhancing-
the-effectiveness-of-the-uk-listing-regime-implementation [https://perma.cc/4392-ZAHM]. 
76 See Listing Rules Instrument 2014, supra note 75, at 19 (requiring a listed company with a 
controlling shareholder “to have in place at all times . . . a constitution that allows the election and 
re-election of independent directors to be conducted in accordance with [the dual-voting structure] 
provisions set out in LR 9.2.2ER and LR 9.2.2FR” (emphasis omitted)). 
77 If the results of these two votes conflict, the election of the director in question may be decided 
by way of another, single (ordinary) majority vote at a meeting to be held at least ninety but not more 
than 120 days after the original vote. See Listing Rules Instrument 2014, supra note 75, at 20-21. 
78 Companies Law, 5759-1999, § 239, 44 (1999-119) (as amended). We have been involved in 
the development of the Israeli law governing the power of public investors in controlled companies 
to influence the election of some external directors. During 2006−2008, Assaf Hamdani chaired, 
and Lucian Bebchuk served as an advisor to, a government committee that recommended reforms 
to Israel’s corporate law to empower minority shareholders to appoint directors. Subsequently, 
during 2011–2012, Lucian Bebchuk served as the outside-expert advisor to Israel’s Economic 
Concentration Committee whose recommendation led to further enhancing the power of the 
minority shareholders to elect directors in a subset of Israeli controlled companies. 
79 Id. § 245. 
80 Id. § 239(b). 
81 Similarly, we should note that Swedish corporate law provides public investors with influence 
over the nomination of some directors in a subset of controlled companies. The Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance sets forth the procedure for establishing a nomination committee for board 
members, and typically representatives of the three to five largest shareholders in the company are 
appointed members of the committee. Even when the company has a dominant shareholder, at least one 
member of the committee must be independent of the company’s largest shareholder. See Rolf Skog & 
Erik Sjöman, Corporate Governance in Sweden, in THE NORDIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL 
247 app. D at 260-62 (Per Lekvall ed., 2014). When the dominant shareholder owns less than fifty percent 
of the voting power, such shareholder must cooperate with other public shareholders in order to secure 
a majority vote at the annual general meeting. See Rolf H. Carlsson, Swedish Corporate Governance and 
Value Creation: Owners Still in the Driver’s Seat, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE 1038, 1049-50 (2007). 
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III. ENHANCED INDEPENDENCE: BUILDING BLOCKS 
Turning independent directors into enhanced-independence directors 
raises complex issues of legal design. In Section A, we develop a framework of 
specific measures that can make enhanced-independence directors more 
accountable to public investors and less dependent on the controller. In Section 
B, we argue that public investors at controlled firms should have at least veto 
rights over enhanced-independence directors’ initial appointment, reelection, 
and termination. In Section C, we explain why even this minority-veto regime 
leaves enhanced-independence directors too dependent on controlling 
shareholders. Thus, we call for a regime that requires support from controllers 
and public investors for the initial election of enhanced-independence 
directors, but leaves controllers with no say over the reelection and termination 
of these directors. 
Providing public investors with a say in director elections raises a host of 
complementary questions that are not directly related to the election regime’s 
structure. We leave the analysis of these questions to the next Part. 
A. Dimensions 
A regime of director elections consists of many specific rules addressing 
issues that may seem technical or mundane. The cumulative impact of these 
rules, however, determines the boundaries of the power held by controlling 
shareholders, public investors, and members of the board. In this Section, we 
unpack the important dimensions of any director-election regime and identify 
the different degrees of influence that public investors can enjoy with respect 
to each dimension. Shareholders generally make three decisions concerning 
director elections: 
• Election of a new candidate to the board (initial appointment); 
• Reelection of an incumbent director for another term (reelection); and 
• Removal of an incumbent director before her term ends (termination).82 
 
82 The regime governing director termination is important in our framework for two reasons. 
First, without restrictions on its ability to terminate enhanced-independence directors, the controller 
can circumvent public investors’ influence over enhanced-independence directors’ election. This is 
consistent with the general rule that only the party who nominates a director can fire her. See, e.g., 8 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2016) (limiting the ability to remove directors with no cause to the 
holders of the class of shares electing them). Second, placing limits on enhanced-independence directors’ 
termination can weaken these directors’ dependence on the controller even when public investors have 
no say on director elections. Perhaps the weakest regime in our context would be to retain the controller’s 
existing rights to elect directors, but to marginally insulate enhanced-independence directors by 
preventing the controller from firing them, without public investors’ consent, before the end of their 
predetermined terms. This rule would leave intact directors’ bond of loyalty stemming from their initial 
election and from their desire for reelection. But an independent director—or a group of directors—who 
rises against abuses by the controller would not automatically face the threat of an immediate dismissal. 
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The powers of the controller and of public investors over each of these 
dimensions will determine the extent to which enhanced-independence directors 
are accountable to the latter and insulated from the former.83 For each of the 
initial appointment, reelection, and termination decisions, public investors can 
wield one of the following degrees of influence:84 
  
• No say in directors’ initial appointment, reelection, and termination. The 
controller alone has the power to determine the outcome of the vote (the 
controller-election rule). This is the historical norm for director election.85 
• Power to veto the controller’s decisions (the minority-veto rule or the veto-
rights rule). 
• Exclusive power to make a decision even against the controller’s objection 
(the minority-election rule). 
 
The degree of influence held by controllers and private investors does not 
have to be the same for each type of decision. Policymakers can vary public 
investors’ degree of influence across dimensions (choosing from among at 
least twenty-seven specific combinations) to produce the precise balance of 
power between controlling shareholders and public investors that they find 
optimal. For example, granting public investors more power over reelection 
than initial appointment decisions can create an appropriate balance between 
the need to make enhanced-independence directors accountable to public 
investors and the concern about undermining the controller’s ability to 
manage the company. 
At the same time, policymakers should be aware that adopting one regime 
to govern one dimension may affect another dimension. Granting public 
investors a say over initial appointment decisions, for example, will not have 
much impact if the controlling shareholder has the unlimited power to fire 
directors at will. Finally, note that lawmakers can take power away from the 
controller without increasing the degree to which public investors can influence 
director elections. For example, one could restrict the ability of controllers to 
fire directors by setting mandatory terms limits without providing public 
investors with the power to elect or veto directors. 
Table A summarizes the options that are available for policymakers vis-à-vis 
the prevailing regimes in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Italy. 
   
 
Although rare, there are cases in which directors decide to confront the controlling shareholder. See, e.g., 
In re Dole Food Co., Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 8703, 2015 WL 5052214, at *12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015) 
(describing two outside directors’ opposition to a self-tender proposed by the controller). 
83 A director election regime often addresses other dimensions, such as directors’ term limits 
and the right to nominate directors. We address these dimensions below. See infra Sections IV.C–D. 
84 We assume for now that public investors make decisions through a majority-of-minority 
vote. We discuss cumulative voting in subsection III.C.4. 
85 See supra Section II.B. 
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Table A: Director Election Regimes 
 
Controller-
Election Rule 
Veto Rights Minority Power 
Initial 
Appointment 
United States 
 
United Kingdom, 
Israel
Italy, AMEX 
Termination 
United States, 
United Kingdom, 
Italy
Israel AMEX 
Renewal United States United Kingdom Israel, AMEX 
  
The gray-shaded column represents the prevailing U.S. regime. As 
explained in Part II, the default regime in the United States, as in many other 
countries, follows the controller-election rule for all dimensions: that is, the 
controlling shareholder has the exclusive power to make initial appointment, 
reelection, and termination decisions. Public investors have no say over these 
decisions. A shareholder with a majority of the votes can elect all board 
members, decide whether to renew their terms, or fire them at will. 
Both the old AMEX guidelines and the Italian regime adopt the minority-
election rule with respect to directors’ initial election decisions.86 These regimes 
empower public investors to appoint some fraction of board members even 
against the controller’s objection. The United Kingdom’s new listing regime and 
Israeli corporate law adopt the veto rights rule to govern enhanced-independence 
directors’ initial appointments.87 Under the UK regime, for example, the 
appointment of independent directors requires not only a majority of the votes 
cast at the meeting but also a majority-of-minority shareholder vote.88 
Israel and the United Kingdom, however, provide public investors with 
different degrees of influence over director reelection decisions. While the United 
Kingdom adopts the minority-veto rule, Israeli law adopts the minority-election 
rule, under which public investors can decide to reelect an incumbent 
enhanced-independence director even against the controller’s objections. 
B. Veto Rights 
In this Section, we argue that public investors should have at least veto 
rights over enhanced-independence directors’ initial appointment, reelection, 
and termination. Although it will not eliminate these directors’ dependence 
 
86 See supra text accompanying notes 68–73. 
87 See supra text accompanying notes 75–77, 79–80. 
88 See supra text accompanying note 77. 
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on the controller, this regime offers a compromise between the need to make 
enhanced-independence directors accountable to public investors and the 
concern that the minority-election rule will disrupt the controller’s ability to 
run the company.89 
1. Benefits 
For enhanced-independence directors to be accountable to public 
investors, these investors should have at least veto rights over the directors’ 
initial appointment and reelection. In other words, the minority-veto rule is 
the threshold requirement for enhanced-independence directors. To prevent 
the controlling shareholder from circumventing the regime by firing directors 
who do not favor its own interests, public investors’ veto power should also 
extend to enhanced-independence directors’ termination. Under this regime, 
however, public investors cannot appoint enhanced-independence directors 
to whom the controlling shareholder objects. 
This minority-veto regime offers a compromise between the need to make 
enhanced-independence directors accountable to public investors and the 
concern that denying the controller any say over director election would 
undermine its ability to run the company. Public investors cannot appoint 
enhanced-independence directors or reelect them against the controller’s will, 
but they can prevent the appointment of an enhanced-independence director 
who is clearly beholden to the controller or whose reputation suggests that 
she will not adequately safeguard public investors’ interests. Thus, while this 
regime will not eliminate enhanced-independence directors’ dependence on 
the controller, these directors still need public investors’ support for their 
initial appointment and reelection. 
Public investors’ veto power is perhaps most effective in the decision to 
reelect an incumbent enhanced-independence director. Public investors will 
presumably decide how to vote on the basis of the director’s past performance 
on the board.90 A director who favored the controller’s interests over those of 
the company or its public investors might be voted out of office. This, then, 
 
89 See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 
560, 594-605 (2016) (proposing a theory stressing the value of enabling controlling shareholders to 
set the firm’s strategic direction). 
90 For instance, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) examines the accountability, 
responsiveness, composition, skills, and independence of each director and the board as a whole. A 
combination of poor company performance and poor accountability may lead to a negative vote, as may 
a lack of proper attendance and sitting on an excessive number of other boards. INSTITUTIONAL 
S’HOLDER SERVS., UNITED STATES SUMMARY PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES: 2015 BENCHMARKS 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 11-15 (2015), http://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/1_2015-us-summary
-voting-guidelines-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/53TM-LTFG]. 
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provides enhanced-independence directors with an incentive to cater to 
public investors’ interests. 
Critics may argue that this regime leaves the controller with too much 
power. As we explain below, controllers are more likely than public investors 
to make effective use of their veto rights, thereby undermining the 
accountability incentives generated by the minority-veto rule. By contrast, 
supporters of this regime may argue that it introduces a significant degree of 
accountability to public investors while addressing the concern that the 
minority-election rule will excessively interfere with the controller’s ability 
to determine the company’s business strategy. 
2. Implementing Veto Rights 
The principal mechanism for granting public investors veto rights over an 
enhanced-independence director’s initial appointment and reelection is 
requiring that the director be approved by a majority of votes cast by public 
investors—that is, shareholders unaffiliated with the controller—in addition 
to an ordinary majority of shareholders. For example, assume that the 
controlling shareholder holds sixty percent of the company’s voting rights. To 
be elected under the minority-veto rule, an enhanced-independence director 
would have to be approved by an ordinary majority (the controller) and by a 
majority of the forty percent not affiliated with the controller.91 
Granting public investors influence over enhanced-independence director 
elections raises the issue of nomination rights. In other words, who will have 
the power to nominate candidates for an enhanced-independence director 
position? One can think of two approaches. Under one approach, only the 
controlling shareholder (or the company or its nomination committee) can 
put forward candidates for an enhanced-independence director position, and 
public investors can only approve or reject the nominated candidate. 
Alternatively, public investors (holding a certain percentage of shares) as well 
as the controller can nominate candidates for the enhanced-independence 
director position. 
 
91 In controlled companies with a one-share-one-vote structure, another mechanism that could 
be considered is requiring that enhanced-independence directors be approved by a supermajority of 
the votes—say sixty-six percent. Such a rule has two benefits. First, it relieves companies and courts 
of the complicated task of classifying shares into those affiliated and those unaffiliated with the 
controller. Second, it provides a relatively simple mechanism for allowing controllers with larger 
control blocks to have greater influence in electing enhanced-independence directors. Such an effect 
is arguably desirable because controllers’ incentives to divert resources become weaker as their equity 
stake increases. 
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The right to nominate directors is rather consequential for widely held 
firms,92 but may not be as important under the veto-rights rule. Even when 
both public investors and the controlling shareholder have the same nominal 
power to put a candidate up for election, the controller is more likely to use 
its nomination right. Collective action problems that discourage dispersed 
public investors from nominating candidates to the board. This disincentive 
is exacerbated when it is clear that no director can be elected against the 
controller’s objection. Nevertheless, we believe that public investors should 
have the right to nominate candidates, as it would improve their bargaining 
position vis-à-vis the controller. 
Finally, one may argue that the veto rights regime can lead to a deadlock 
in which the controller and public investors cannot agree on a candidate. We 
believe, however, that this is not a significant concern. Even if a director 
nominated by the company occasionally fails to get elected, the controller and 
public investors will ultimately agree on a candidate, and the law could design 
mechanisms for ensuring continuity in the interim.93 Moreover, the deadlock 
threat would discourage controllers from nominating candidates whom public 
investors are reasonably likely to reject. 
C. Beyond Veto Rights? 
The preceding Section presented the case for providing public investors 
with at least a veto right over enhanced-independence directors’ initial 
appointment, reelection, and termination. In our work for the Israeli 
government, however, we recommended the adoption of a regime that went 
beyond veto rights to provide public investors with the exclusive power to 
appoint enhanced-independence directors. In this Section, we explain why 
the veto rights regime, by itself, is unlikely to make enhanced-independence 
directors effective monitors of controlling shareholders. Based on this 
analysis, we present the case for a regime under which public investors have 
at least the exclusive power at least over reelection and termination decisions. 
 
92 Nomination rights also would be important under the minority-election rule that we discuss 
in the next Section. 
93 Another question is whether shareholders would use their power to vote on director 
elections. This in turn may depend on whether institutional shareholders are required to cast a vote. 
See Assaf Hamdani & Yishay Yafeh, Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders, 17 REV. FIN. 691, 
701 (2012) (finding that institutional investors in Israel do not vote on director elections even when 
the law grants them the power to veto the controller’s candidates); see also Belcredi & Enriques, 
supra note 69, at 9 (“[N]o Italian institutional investor is under a legal obligation to exercise its 
voting rights in investee companies.”). 
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1. Veto Rights May Not Be Enough 
In theory, the veto-rights rule would make enhanced-independence 
directors equally accountable to public investors and controlling shareholders. 
However, in practice, inevitable differences between public investors and 
controlling shareholders make this regime tilted in favor of the latter. 
First, controllers enjoy a clear informational advantage over public 
investors. Evaluating a new candidate for an enhanced-independence director 
position requires information about the candidate’s qualifications and past 
performance on other boards. Public investors suffer from collective action 
problems, and they may lack incentives to acquire the information needed for 
evaluating candidates.94 The controlling shareholder, in contrast, holds a 
sufficiently large stake to provide it with the incentive to acquire that 
information. This informational asymmetry between controllers and public 
investors becomes stronger with respect to reelection and termination decisions, 
as the controlling shareholder has superior access to nonpublic information about 
the incumbent director’s past board performance. 
Second, collective action problems may undermine public investors’ ability 
to make effective use of their veto rights. As explained earlier,95 dispersed 
public investors are less likely than the controller to nominate a candidate to an 
enhanced-independence director position, especially when the controller 
retains the right to nominate its own candidates to the board. To be sure, a 
minority blockholder may find it worthwhile to incur the costs associated with 
nominating a candidate, but, for the most part, public investors will tend not 
nominate a candidate. 
To summarize, these differences would undermine the effective exercise of 
the powers bestowed on public investors by the veto-rights regime. Public 
investors are most likely to use veto rights only to prevent the appointment of 
clearly unqualified directors or the reelection of directors whose past performance 
demonstrates a willingness to disregard public investors’ interests. By contrast, 
the controller will likely effectively exercise its powers over director nomination, 
election, and reelection. Even under this regime, therefore, enhanced-
independence directors would likely remain more accountable to the controller 
than to public investors. 
2. Public Investors’ Election Rights 
The minority-election regime provided a stronger measure for making 
enhanced-independence directors accountable to public investors. This regime 
 
94 See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 584-91 
(1990) (discussing rational apathy and the dynamics of shareholders’ incentives to become informed). 
95 See supra subsection III.B.2. 
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provides public investors with the right to elect enhanced-independence 
directors over the objections of the controlling shareholder. As with veto rights, 
this regime provides enhanced-independence directors with incentives to 
protect public investors, as these directors will depend on public investors’ 
support to be elected. Unlike veto rights, however, a minority-election regime 
does not provide enhanced-independence directors with incentives to favor the 
controller, whose support is not required for their continued service on the 
board. Such a regime could eventually facilitate a market for professional 
enhanced-independence directors whom public investors will nominate and elect.96 
An effective minority-election rule requires that public investors, at least 
occasionally, use their rights to appoint their own representatives to the board. 
Moreover, eliminating incentives to favor the controller requires that the controller 
be unable to exert influence over the election of enhanced-independence directors. 
However, the experience with widely held firms in the United States 
demonstrates that even insiders who lack formal power to nominate directors 
may exert considerable influence over director elections through their de facto 
control over the nomination process. Therefore, the ultimate impact of the 
minority-election rule will depend both on the rules governing director 
nominations and on the degree to which public investors will use their election 
and nomination rights. 
First, consider director nomination rules. Even if public investors have the 
right to nominate enhanced-independence directors, the likelihood that public 
investors will do so depends on the preconditions for making nominations. If the 
percentage of shares required to nominate directors is too high, for example, 
dispersed public investors may find it too costly to organize and put forward a list 
of candidates. Thus, unless the company has a minority blockholder with enough 
at stake, controlling shareholders will continue to influence director nominations. 
Next, consider the extent to which public investors are likely to use their 
nomination rights. Rules that facilitate director nomination by public investors 
will eliminate the controller’s de facto control over the process only to the extent 
that public investors actually use their power. This in turn may depend on the 
degree of shareholder activism by institutional investors or on the presence of 
activist hedge funds in each country. 
At any rate, empowering public investors to nominate candidates does not 
mean that those investors should always use that right. If they trust the 
controller, public investors may vote for the controller’s candidates rather than 
nominate their own. Yet, the mere power to nominate their own candidates 
provides public investors with an important check on the controller. 
 
96 For a proposal for creating a market of professional directors appointed by institutional 
investors, see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for 
Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991). 
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The analysis thus far has addressed the concern that even the minority-election 
rule would leave controllers with de facto influence over director elections. Another 
potential objection to this rule, however, is that it provides public investors with too 
much power. Allowing public investors to elect directors, so the argument goes, 
would interfere with controlling shareholders’ ability to exercise appropriate 
control over the corporation. Furthermore, it might be argued, this interference 
would be counterproductive for public investors, who generally benefit from the 
controllers’ monitoring of management.97 
We consider these objections in Section V.A below. As we explain there, 
enhanced-independence directors would have an important role only in those 
cases where the legal system recognizes the need to protect public investors from 
controllers’ conflicts. However, even those who are genuinely concerned that 
providing public investors with full election rights would interfere with the 
controller’s ability to manage the firm should accept a regime under which public 
investors have exclusive power only over reelection and termination decisions. 
We discuss this regime in the next subsection. 
3. Reelection and Termination 
Under this regime, both public investors and the controller have veto 
rights at the initial appointment stage. At the reelection stage, however, the 
minority-election rule applies and public investors can reelect an incumbent 
director regardless of the controller’s position. To prevent controllers from 
circumventing this reelection power, public investors should also have at least 
veto rights over termination decisions. This regime addresses the concerns 
underlying both the minority-veto rule, discussed in Section III.B., and the 
minority-election regime, discussed in the preceding subsection. 
First, the controller’s veto right at the initial election stage removes the 
concern that the minority-election rule will interfere with the controller’s 
ability to run the company or lead to the appointment of unfit directors. After 
all, by supporting the directors’ initial election, the controlling shareholder 
has signaled its judgment that these directors are qualified to join the board. 
Even those who believe that the controller should have the power to veto 
candidates can agree that from this point on, enhanced-independence 
directors should be most concerned about the views of public investors. 
Second, compared to the veto-rights rule, this regime bolsters enhanced-
independence directors’ accountability to public investors. Because the controller 
has no formal say over reelection and termination, directors will not depend on 
the controller for the continuation of their service on the board and, therefore, 
 
97 For an analysis of the potential cost of providing public investors at controlled companies 
with excessive protection, see Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 89, at 595-98. 
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have no significant incentive to accommodate the controller’s interests after 
their initial appointment. 
Third, this regime prevents controllers from circumventing any rules 
against firing directors. A director who knows that her reelection depends on 
the controller’s support may decide to resign if she feels that the controller is 
unlikely to support her.98 With just a hint of the controller’s intentions, the 
director might resign to save herself the embarrassment of not getting reelected 
or nominated. By giving public investors sole authority for termination 
decisions, the minority-election rule would preclude such measures. 
Finally, this regime can be beneficial for legal systems wishing to pursue 
a gradual approach to director-election reforms at controlled companies. For 
example, countries where public investors currently have no say in enhanced-
independence director elections may want to start with a regime that grants 
public investors some limited powers without denying the controller any role. 
To be sure, this intermediate regime leaves controllers with considerable 
influence over enhanced-independence directors. Directors will remain 
dependent on the controller for their initial appointment, and, as under the 
prevailing regime, they might feel gratitude towards the shareholder who 
appointed them—in other words, “You dance with the one who brought you 
to the party.” As we explained above, however, this regime alleviates any 
concerns that eliminating the controller’s ability to conduct initial screening 
of candidates would prove counterproductive.99 
4. Cumulative Voting 
The analysis has thus far assumed that the mechanism for providing 
public investors with election rights is subjecting enhanced-independence 
director election to a majority-of-minority vote. Another way to allow public 
investors to elect directors is with a cumulative voting system. 
Cumulative voting essentially provides for proportional board representation, 
in which a sufficiently large minority can elect one or more board members.100 
Under “straight” voting, shareholders hold a separate vote for each seat. Thus, a 
 
98 See Michaël Dewally & Sarah W. Peck, Upheaval in the Boardroom: Outside Director Public 
Resignations, Motivations, and Consequences, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 38, 51 (2010) (“[D]irectors resign when 
they feel they can no longer monitor the CEO.”). 
99 One can think of complex or intermediate versions of this regime. For example, a regime under 
which the controller has to elect a list of candidates (say twice the number of open enhanced-independence 
director positions on the board) from which public investors will have to choose. We do not discuss such 
complex variations in this Article. 
100 For a formal analysis of the likely outcomes of cumulative voting under different patterns 
of share ownership, see Arthur T. Cole, Jr., Legal and Mathematical Aspects of Cumulative Voting, 2 
S.C.L.Q. 225 (1950), and Amihai Glazer et al., Cumulative Voting in Corporate Elections: Introducing 
Strategy into the Equation, 35 S.C. L. REV. 295, 299-308 (1984). 
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shareholder with a majority of the votes can elect all board members. In a 
cumulative voting system, shareholders vote for candidates as a group: each 
share entitles its owner to as many votes as there are directors to be elected, and 
shareholders can allocate their votes among candidates as they choose.101 
Cumulative voting can, in some cases, enable public investors to elect 
directors. It might thereby be superior to the prevailing regime, under which 
the controller alone elects all board members.102 Nevertheless, we find 
cumulative voting to be overall inferior to the minority-election rule. 
First, cumulative voting cannot be used to produce some of the 
intermediate regimes designed to balance public investor protection against 
controller rights. For example, it would be quite challenging to use this 
mechanism to provide public investors with different degrees of influence over 
different decisions concerning director election say, one that applies the 
minority-veto rule to initial appointments but the minority-election rule to 
reelection and termination decisions. 
Second, cumulative voting is difficult to combine with a regime that assigns 
special tasks to enhanced-independence directors. Enhanced-independence 
directors should play an active role in monitoring controllers’ conflicts, such as 
vetting self-dealing transactions, but under cumulative voting, it may be difficult to 
 
101 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 
94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 127 n.8 (1994) (describing the features of cumulative voting). Another 
regime that would enable public investors to appoint at least some representatives to the board is 
“list voting.” For an analysis of this regime and a proposal to adopt it even for companies without 
controlling shareholders, see Marco Ventoruzzo, Empowering Shareholders in Directors’ Elections: A 
Revolution in the Making, 8 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 105 (2011). 
102 Cumulative voting offers two advantages over the majority-of-minority regime. First, it 
obviates the need to engage in the complicated task of identifying shareholders unaffiliated with the 
controller. Second, it provides controllers with greater influence. Assume that the board has ten 
members. A controller with fifty-one percent of the votes would be able to elect at least five board 
members; a controller with eighty percent of the votes, in contrast, would be able to elect at least 
eight board members. This outcome is consistent with the view that public investors’ protection 
should become weaker as the percentage of the controller’s economic ownership increases. See 
Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1911, 1947-49 (1996) (arguing that cumulative voting can give “large minority shareholders a place 
on the board and a voice in board actions”); see also Bernard Black et al., Corporate Governance in 
Korea at the Millennium: Enhancing International Competitiveness: Final Report and Legal Reform 
Recommendations to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea, 26 J. CORP. L. 537, 589-90 (2001) 
(recommending that Korea strengthen cumulative voting to protect large minority shareholders); 
Pritchard, supra note 38, at 21-22 (arguing that making cumulative voting mandatory would allow 
institutional investors in Korea “to have an effective voice” on board composition). Cumulative 
voting is common in Chile. See WORLD BANK, REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS 
AND CODES (ROSC): CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNTRY ASSESSMENT: CHILE 4 (2003), 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/14493/350180CL0Corporate0govern
ance0rosc1chlcg.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UBP-V7WM]. In Brazil, cumulative voting is a right of 
“shareholders holding at least 10% of the common shares.” Bernard S. Black et al., Corporate Governance 
in Brazil, 11 EMERGING MARKETS REV. 21, 29 (2010). 
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identify the directors whom public investors actually elected. Third, cumulative 
voting can enable a minority shareholder with a substantial stake to appoint a 
director of whom the majority of public investors disapprove. In contrast, a 
majority-of-minority requirement ensures that such a minority blockholder 
will be able to get a director on the board only if the majority of public investors 
support her; the requirement thus addresses the concern that the blockholder 
would be able to use the director to its benefit at the expense of the majority of 
public investors.103 
IV. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
In the remainder of this Article, we use the term enhanced-independence 
directors to refer to independent directors whose appointment, reelection, and 
termination are at least subject to the minority-veto regime. In this Part, we 
turn to discuss how policymakers could implement reforms designed to 
promote enhanced-independence directors.  
Section A focuses on legal regimes—most notably Delaware’s corporate 
law—that use judicial review standards for encouraging the use of independent 
directors. We explain that, in such regimes, courts can similarly encourage the 
use of enhanced-independence directors by according substantial deference to 
director approval of conflicted decisions only when the approval is made by 
enhanced-independence directors. Section B in turn considers regimes that use 
legislation, regulations, or listing standards to require publicly traded 
companies to appoint independent directors and have them play a role in 
vetting conflicted decisions. We explain that, in such regimes, it would be 
desirable to replace substantial reliance on independent directors with reliance 
on enhanced-independence directors. 
The remainder of this Part discusses implementation issues that both regimes 
need to consider. Section C examines the number of enhanced-independence 
directors that should be on a board and the role that they should play. Section D 
considers the role of term limits in supplementing enhanced-independence 
director election rules. Section E discusses whether enhanced-independence 
directors should be independent from minority blockholders. 
 
103 Another difficulty with cumulative voting is that it requires complicated adjustments for 
companies with a staggered board, for companies with a dual-class voting structure, or for companies 
whose shareholders have special election rights. See McDonough v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 
277 F. Supp. 6, 7-8 (E.D. Mich. 1967) (discussing an attempt to evade mandatory cumulative voting 
rules by staggering the board). 
For completeness, we should also note that cumulative voting has the advantage of making it 
unnecessary to identify shareholders unaffiliated with the controller. Still, for the reasons explained 
above, we view cumulative voting to be overall inferior to the minority-election regime. 
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A. Regimes Based on Judicial Review 
For concreteness, we shall focus below on Delaware, the most well-known 
regime that is based on judicial review. Delaware’s corporate statute does not 
require companies to appoint independent directors. Rather, Delaware’s courts 
use standards of judicial review to encourage companies to appoint independent 
directors and to assign them a role in approving conflicted decisions.104 
As we explained above, however, directors whose appointment, retention 
and termination are solely determined by the controller cannot be relied on to 
guard against controller opportunism. Therefore, Delaware courts should not 
grant any substantial cleansing power to approval of conflicted decisions by 
independent directors. Courts can encourage the use of enhanced-independence 
directors by according substantial deference to director approval of conflicted 
decisions only when the approval is made by enhanced-independence directors. 
Reliance on enhanced-independence to guard against controller opportunism 
would be far superior to reliance on independent directors who are completely 
dependent on the controller for their appointment. 
Indeed, adopting the enhanced-independence approach might, in some 
cases, provide an option to avoid more costly interventions. Some Delaware 
court decisions, such as the recent decision by Vice Chancellor Laster in 
EzCorp, have expressed reluctance to defer to approval of self-dealing 
transactions by independent directors appointed by the controller.105 Under this 
approach, any self-dealing transaction by the controller, however small in scale, 
would be subject to close judicial scrutiny if challenged unless approved by a 
majority-of-the-minority shareholder vote. Either route would involve 
significant costs. Enhanced-independence directors offer an alternative route 
with a cleansing device that some might deem to be sufficiently effective to 
forgo such interventions. 
Finally, we should note that the judicial approach considered in this Section 
would encourage rather than require companies to have enhanced-independence 
directors. Controllers could decide not to have enhanced-independence directors 
if they viewed them as too costly. In such a case, the controller would have to 
 
104 See supra text accompanying notes 32–34. The analysis here applies to any legal system that 
relies on courts to encourage companies to appoint independent directors and entrust them with 
reviewing self-dealing transactions. For a thoughtful analysis of the role of judicial review in regulating 
self-dealing transactions, see Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory 
Meets Reality, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 393 (2003). 
105 See In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., No. 9962, 2016 WL 301245, at 
*11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016) (“Under current law, the entire fairness framework governs any transaction 
between a controller and the controlled corporation in which the controller receives a non-ratable 
benefit.”); T. Rowe Price Recovery Fund, L.P. v. Rubin, 770 A.2d 536, 552 (Del. Ch. June 23, 2000) 
(“[B]oth the Supreme Court and this court explicitly held that the entire fairness standard of review 
applies in the non-merger context to interested transaction involving controlling stockholders.”). 
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either avoid self-dealing transactions and other conflicted decisions or bear the 
costs of having them subject to judicial scrutiny. 
B. Regimes Based on Legislation or Regulation 
As explained above, jurisdictions in other parts of the world have legal rules 
requiring controlled companies to have independent directors and requiring 
that these directors approve certain conflicted decisions.106 Our analysis 
indicates that it would be preferable for these jurisdictions to replace their 
substantial reliance on independent directors with substantial reliance on 
enhanced-independence directors. 
To implement the enhanced-independence approach, such jurisdictions 
would have to adopt their own system of rules that address the aspects of the 
enhanced-independence regime that we discuss in this Article. Among other 
things, such a jurisdiction would have to specify the required number of 
enhanced-independence directors; the type of input rights that public investors 
would have at the initial election, retention, and termination stages; and the 
type of corporate decisions that enhanced-independence directors would have 
to approve. The framework that we provide in this Article could be useful for 
the design of the necessary rules and regulations. 
C. Number and Role of Enhanced-Independence Directors 
Our analysis thus far has focused on the director election regime. In this 
Section, we discuss the supplementary arrangements required to ensure that, 
once elected, enhanced-independence directors will be able to play a 
meaningful role in vetting conflicted decisions. Our analysis aims to highlight 
the principal considerations that should guide policymakers. A full analysis of 
these issues is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Enhanced-independence directors cannot protect public investors unless 
they hold sufficient power over conflicted decisions. At the same time, providing 
these directors with too much power might undermine the controller’s ability to 
run the firm. Thus, enhanced-independence directors should play a dominant 
role in reviewing conflicted decisions but take a backseat with respect to other 
corporate affairs. 
1. Role 
On the one hand, as enhanced-independence directors become more 
accountable to public investors, the controller and the directors it puts in place 
might try to marginalize enhanced-independence directors. Even if they are 
 
106 See supra text accompanying notes 36–42. 
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genuinely accountable to public investors, enhanced-independence directors 
cannot adequately safeguard public investors’ interests if such directors lack the 
power to veto self-dealing and other tunneling transactions.107 
On the other hand, providing enhanced-independence directors with overly 
broad powers can interfere with the controller’s ability to run the company even 
when its interests align with those of public investors. Practically, the controller 
exercises its control by appointing its representatives to the board. As directors 
become less dependent on the controller for their election, the controller’s 
ability to exert influence over the company’s direction declines. Under the 
minority-election regime, for example, public investors can elect directors even 
against the controller’s objection. These minority-elected directors may have 
their own views concerning the direction that the company should take, thereby 
interfering with the controller’s ability to exercise control.108 
Therefore, lawmakers should not grant enhanced-independence directors too 
much power over issues that raise no conflict between the controller and public 
investors. As a matter of principle, the role of enhanced-independence directors 
should track the fundamental distinction between business and self-dealing 
transactions. These directors should play a critical role in decisions that raise 
concerns about a conflict of interest between the controller and public investors. 
They should thus have the power to review, negotiate, and approve freezeouts 
and other self-dealing transactions involving the controlling shareholder.109 But 
the controller-elected directors should be able to decide such issues as the firm’s 
business strategy even over enhanced-independence directors’ objections.110 
 
107 See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 125, 209-10 (2006) (noting, with respect to Chinese corporate law, that “[c]orporate 
officers and fellow directors have few incentives to listen to independent directors because 
independent directors have little in the way of veto power over corporate actions”). 
108 One of us has recently argued that controllers may find it difficult to convey to independent 
directors the value of their vision for the company. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 89, at 601 
(“[A]symmetric information and differences of opinion could prevent the controller-entrepreneur 
from credibly communicating her idiosyncratic vision . . . .”). 
109 Should enhanced-independence directors play a role in monitoring financial disclosure? 
While a full analysis of this question is outside the scope of this Article, we are inclined to answer 
this question in the negative for two reasons. First, although controllers may occasionally have 
reasons to mislead public investors (when they raise capital, for example), it seems that financial 
disclosure is not a pervasive source of conflicts between controllers and public investors. Second, 
given the severe legal and reputational sanctions associated with misreporting, it is unclear that 
making directors accountable to minority investors would play a meaningful role in inducing 
independent directors to ensure accurate reporting. 
110 Drawing the line between conflicted and nonconflicted decisions regarding the public 
investors’ interests is not always easy. For discussions of the difficulties involved in drawing this line, 
see Luca Enriques, Related Party Transactions: Policy Options and Real-World Challenges (With a Critique 
of the European Commission Proposal), 16 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1, 2 (2014); and Goshen & 
Hamdani, supra note 89, at 606-08. As noted earlier, this Article does not seek to contribute to the 
identification of the corporate decisions that the law should regard as conflicted. 
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2. Number 
Because enhanced-independence directors should play an important role in 
evaluating and approving conflicted decisions, we believe that companies should 
appoint at least two such directors.111 At the same time, enhanced-independence 
directors should not constitute a majority of the board. As we explained above, 
granting these directors too much say over corporate affairs may undermine the 
controller’s ability to set the strategic direction of the firm. Were enhanced-
independence directors to constitute a majority of the board, they would have the 
power to set the firm’s direction and make other decisions over the objections of 
the controller’s representatives, even in the absence of any conflict of interest. 
Thus, limiting enhanced-independence directors to a minority of the board offers 
a reasonable balance between controller management and minority protection. 
D. Length of Appointment 
Arrangements concerning directors’ terms in office can supplement rules 
concerning their elections. The need for term limits and tenure requirements 
generally arises when the director election regime leaves even enhanced-
independence directors somewhat dependent on the controller, such as under 
the minority-veto rule. As we explain in this Section, however, this need may 
arise for other reasons, including when public investors have substantial 
influence over director elections. 
Consider first the prevailing regime, under which the controller-election 
rule applies and companies do not have enhanced-independence directors. 
Although independent directors are not accountable to public investors, 
subjecting them to both term limits and minimum-tenure requirements limits 
controllers’ ability to terminate them and, consequently, weakens their 
dependence on the controllers. To be sure, these directors will depend on the 
controller for their initial appointment and reelection. Yet, limiting how many 
years they can serve constrains the controller’s ability to “reward” directors with 
reelection.112 At some point, these directors will have to leave the board 
 
111 As described above, the regime in Italy requires only one enhanced-independence director. 
See Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 69, at 8; see also supra text accompanying notes 70–73. 
112 Note that Delaware courts have not taken the view that an especially long time of board service 
at a controlled company categorically undermines director independence. See, e.g., Friedman v. Dolan, 
No. 9425, 2015 WL 4040806, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (holding that “[n]either long-term board 
service nor the mere fact that one was appointed by a controller suffices” to subvert independence 
(citations omitted); In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6623, 2013 WL 396202, at *6 
n.63 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2013) (explaining that allegations of “‘nearly twenty years of Board service 
alongside [one director] and a long-term relationship with [another director]’ . . . [did] not raise a 
reasonable doubt as to . . . independence under Delaware law” (quoting Verified Consolidated Second 
Amended Class Action Complaint ¶ 68, BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6623, 2013 WL 
396202 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2013) (No. 6623))). For a thorough analysis of the effect of director tenure on 
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regardless of the controller’s satisfaction with their service. Similarly, requiring 
that directors serve for some predetermined number of years before they can 
be replaced ensures that the controller would not be able to displace directors 
who do not cater to its interests.113 
Now consider a regime that adopts the minority-election rule, in which 
public investors can appoint enhanced-independence directors against the 
controller’s objection. Under this regime, term limits are unnecessary and 
even harmful. These enhanced-independence directors will be accountable to 
public investors and have no dependence on the controller. Without any term 
limits, they will face ongoing incentives to act in a manner that will be 
beneficial for public investors. 
Finally, consider the regime in which public investors have only veto rights 
over an enhanced-independence director’s initial appointment but can reelect 
that director even against the controller’s objections. In this case, term limits 
may be required to protect the controller. This regime’s underlying premise is 
that the controller’s support for a director at the initial appointment stage 
ensures that this director is qualified to serve on the board. Yet, without term 
limits, public investors could permanently force a director on the majority 
shareholder simply because of that shareholder’s initial consent to her 
appointment. Indeed, Israeli corporate law, which adopts this regime, imposes 
a limit on the number of years that these directors can serve on the board.114 
E. Independence from Minority Blockholders 
Should enhanced-independence directors be independent from public 
investors, especially from significant blockholders who nominated them? 115 We 
do not take a firm position on this question but would like to flag it. 
Policymakers should consider this issue, especially where enhanced-independence 
arrangements provide public investors with full election rights. 
To illustrate, assume that the controller owns sixty percent of the 
company’s shares and that the minority-election rule applies. In this regime, 
public investors have the exclusive right to appoint enhanced-independence 
directors regardless of the controller’s view. Assume further that a large investor, 
owning eight percent of the shares, nominates an enhanced-independence 
 
director independence, see generally Yaron Nili, The “New Insiders”: Rethinking Independent Directors’ 
Tenure, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 97 (2016). 
113 See, e.g., In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., 2015 WL 5052214, at *1528 (Del. Ch. Aug. 
27, 2015) (describing how a controlling shareholder and one of his senior executives forced an outside 
director who opposed a self-tender offer proposed by the controller to resign). 
114 They can serve no more than three terms of three years. See Israeli Companies Law, 5759–1999, 
§ 245, 44 (1999-119). 
115 For a discussion raising concerns about directors who are not independent of the minority 
shareholders that nominated them, see Gutiérrez & Sáez, supra note 6, at 91. 
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director. Clearly, this director should be independent of the controller and the 
company. But should she be independent from the blockholder who put forward 
her candidacy? 
The case against this new independence requirement relies on the premise 
that shareholders with a significant equity stake have an incentive to monitor 
corporate insiders for the benefit of the company and its public investors. 
Having blockholders’ representatives on the board will enable them to monitor 
corporate insiders more effectively. Indeed, studies have found that the 
presence of blockholders on the board tends to improve pay practices and 
CEO accountability.116 Moreover, unlike controlling shareholders under the 
majority-election rule, blockholders in our setting (i.e., minority shareholders 
with a significant equity stake) cannot dictate the outcome of a shareholder 
vote. Rather, a blockholder-nominated candidate will join the board only if a 
majority-of-minority shareholders support her candidacy.117 This majority-of-
minority requirement alleviates the concern that blockholders might appoint 
directors in order to pursue their own agendas.118 
The case for requiring extra independence focuses on the concern that 
blockholders who nominate directors may pursue their own agendas to extract 
private benefits or disrupt the controller’s ability to run the firm. Directors 
with no ties to a blockholder are more likely to advance the interests of the 
company and its public investors even when that blockholder nominated them 
for the position.119 
 
116 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors, 65 J. FIN. 2363, 2365 (2010) 
(finding that having a compensation committee that is both independent and includes at least one 
blockholder reduces the likelihood of “lucky” option grants to corporate executives); see also Anup 
Agrawal & Tareque Nasser, Blockholders on Boards and CEO Compensation, Turnover and Firm 
Valuation 26 (Sept. 1, 2012) (Am. Fin. Ass’n 2012 Chi. Meetings Paper, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=1443431 [https://perma.cc/G4GC-97EA] (finding that CEOs of firms with blockholder directors tend 
to have lower pay and higher turnover-performance sensitivity). 
117 As we explained earlier, the need to prevent blockholders from having the power to appoint 
directors not supported by a majority of minority investors is an important reason to disfavor 
cumulative voting. See supra subsection III.C.4. 
118 Some of the issues that we analyze here arise also in the context of widely held firms, where 
the question is whether directors nominated by activist investors should be independent from these 
investors. For a discussion of these issues in the latter context, see generally Matthew D. Cain et al., 
How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 649 (2016), and 
Yaron Nili, Servants of Two Masters? The Feigned Hysteria over Activist-Paid Directors, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. 
L. 509 (2016). 
119 Note that the need for independence from a nominating blockholder is significantly reduced 
when the controller can veto public investors’ candidates to the board. The controller would 
presumably use its veto power to prevent the appointment of a director whose goal is to enable 
blockholders to extract private benefits of control. 
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V. OBJECTIONS 
This Part considers potential objections to our proposals. Section A 
addresses the claim that providing public investors—that is, minority 
shareholders—with a say over director elections will undermine the 
controller’s ability to run the company. Section B considers the claim that 
enhanced-independence directors might undermine board effectiveness and 
collegiality. Section C discusses the claim that granting public investors a say 
over director elections might enable minority blockholders to extract private 
benefits. Section D explains why enhanced-independence directors improve 
investor protection even when self-dealing transactions are subject to a vote 
by public investors. 
Before considering these objections, we would like to note that our 
framework accommodates many different degrees of public investor 
influence. Thus, even if one finds any of the following objections convincing, 
the appropriate response may be to choose a regime that provides a different 
balance between public investors and the controller’s power to appoint 
enhanced-independence directors. 
A. Undermining Control 
The first objection we address is that allowing public investors to elect 
directors will interfere with the controlling shareholders’ ability to exercise 
control over the corporation. On this view, minority shareholders in a controlled 
company have accepted, and might indeed prefer, that the controller will 
determine the strategic and business path of the company. We have discussed this 
objection at several points above, so our analysis in this Section can be brief. 
Ultimately, enhanced-independence directors would not undermine the 
controller’s ability to determine business decisions that do not involve a conflict. 
Recall that our analysis focuses on regimes that chose to rely on independent 
directors to contain controllers’ opportunism. The goal of encouraging 
companies to appoint enhanced-independence directors is to provide at least 
some directors with incentives to stand up to the controller when undesirable 
self-dealing takes place. The question, however, is whether directors who are 
genuinely accountable to public investors will disrupt the controller’s ability to 
make other business decisions or determine the company’s direction. For the 
reasons we explain below, we believe that enhanced-independence directors will 
not necessarily interfere with the controller’s ability to make business decisions. 
First, note that controlling shareholders occasionally grant minority 
blockholders the right to board representation.120 Having these representatives 
 
120 See J. Travis Laster & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights and Duties of Blockholder Directors, 
70 BUS. LAW. 33, 60 (2014/2015) (arguing that both majority and minority constituency directors should 
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on the board, however, does not necessarily undermine the controllers’ ability 
to run the company. Our framework can be viewed as granting dispersed public 
investors rights similar to those that minority blockholders may receive. 
Second, as explained in subsection IV.C.2, policymakers should ensure 
that enhanced-independence directors remain a minority of board members 
and play a key role only when the controller is conflicted. Ensuring that 
enhanced-independence directors can veto only a limited subset of decisions 
would address disruption concerns while preserving the directors’ incentives 
to protect public investors. Indeed, as public investors have more power over 
director elections, policymakers should take greater care to ensure that 
enhanced-independence directors can block only those transactions in which 
a clear conflict of interest exists. 
Third, the concern that the minority-election rule undermines the 
controller’s ability to run the firm should not necessarily preclude public 
investors from having a say over director elections. At most, this concern 
suggests that the veto-rights rule should govern initial appointment decisions; 
that is, controllers should have veto power over initial appointments while the 
minority-election rule applies to reelection and termination decisions. 
Finally, note that we do not argue that legal systems should rely on 
independent directors to monitor conflicted decisions. Those who believe that 
enhanced-independence directors would impose an excessive burden on 
corporate decisionmaking should consider replacing independent director 
approval with other measures for addressing controller opportunism. However, 
as we have shown in this Article, they should not place substantial reliance on 
independent-director vetting of conflicted decisions. 
B. Loss of Collegiality and Cohesiveness 
The second objection we consider focuses on the unique nature of the board’s 
work. An effective board requires an environment that facilitates cooperation 
among board members and fosters trust between the board as a whole and 
corporate insiders. Having even a few directors who represent public investors, 
so the argument goes, would interfere with board cohesiveness and undermine 
the trust between the board and corporate insiders, as directors will become 
adversarial and uncooperative when seeking reelection by public investors. 
 
compromise to ensure a balance of rights); Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of 
Constituency Directors, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 309, 365-77 (2013) (taking the position that current 
fiduciary rules should be reformed to keep constituency directors in check); E. Norman Veasey & 
Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing 
Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 774-75 (2008) (arguing that the current standards of fiduciary 
duty and liability are sufficient to ensure that constituency directors act on behalf of all shareholders). 
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We would first like to note that objections of this type arise, even at widely 
held companies, against any form of external intervention in the boards’ work or 
composition, including the fundamental requirement for independent directors 
and even director liability.121 Yet, as recent developments in the U.S. regime 
governing widely held companies demonstrate, the goal of incentive alignment 
prevails over collegiality concerns. Indeed, there are those who believe that 
external intervention is necessary to overcome the reluctance of individual directors 
to challenge group consensus.122 Moreover, board cohesiveness may not be 
desirable when a genuine conflict arises between controllers and public investors. 
C. Public Investor Passivity 
We have thus far addressed arguments that enhanced-independence 
directors would overburden public companies and their controllers. One may 
argue, however, that enhanced-independence directors would provide public 
investors with insufficient protection, because public investors are likely to 
remain passive. Rationally apathetic investors, the argument goes, would fail 
to make an effective use of their power to elect directors. This, in turn, would 
make enhanced-independence directors too favorable to the controller and 
insufficiently attentive to the interests of the minority shareholders. 
This concern is clearly inconsistent with market conditions in the United 
States and other developed markets where shareholder activists, institutional 
investors, and proxy advisory firms are prominent. Even in less developed 
capital markets, however, this claim does not undermine the case for our 
proposed regime. 
The proposed regime introduces an important safety valve that can bolster 
investor protection even when public investors largely remain passive. Public 
investors may decide to use their election rights when controllers divert value 
on a large scale or when an activist shareholder emerges. The prospect of public 
investors rejecting that shareholder’s candidate or nominating their own 
candidates (under the minority-election regime) will thus have some deterrent 
effect on controlling shareholders. 
 
121 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate 
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 49-50 (2002) (arguing that judicial review might destroy the 
“interpersonal relationships” that foster internal board governance); Donald C. Langevoort, The 
Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and 
Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 800 (2001) (arguing that “too much true independence in the 
boardroom . . . [can] reduc[e] the level of trust that comes from closer or less adversarial 
relationships, [] chill[] communication . . . and interfere[] with the board as a productive team in all 
its capacities, including monitoring”). 
122 See generally Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1233, 1237 (2003) (explaining the role of social psychology in the Enron Board’s actions). 
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At any rate, the introduction of enhanced-independence directors would be 
an improvement over the prevailing regime of director election. Concern over 
public investors’ passivity, however, may require policymakers to supplement 
the proposed regime with other measures of investor protection, such as private 
or public enforcement. 
D. Public Investor Opportunism 
One may argue that minority shareholders holding relatively large blocks 
of shares might opportunistically use veto rights or the minority-election 
regime to blackmail the controller to extract private benefits.123 Under the 
minority-election rule, for example, these blockholders might deliberately 
nominate people who would threaten to disrupt the board’s work to blackmail 
the controller. 
We find this critique unconvincing. A strategy of disrupting value-enhancing 
projects will harm not only the controller but also public investors. Thus, an 
opportunistic minority blockholder—one who nominates board candidates for 
the sole purpose of blackmailing the controller—is unlikely to secure the public 
investor votes required to appoint its candidate. Moreover, it is now commonly 
believed that significant controller-backed self-dealing transactions should be 
subject to a vote by public investors, i.e., a majority of minority shareholders.124 
Such votes already provide an opportunistic minority blockholder with at least 
the same power to extract private benefits as would public investor votes on 
director elections. 
Finally, enhanced-independence directors could be required to be 
independent from blockholders who put forward their nomination. This 
requirement, in turn, would address concerns that blockholders may use their 
influence over director nominations to extract private benefits. 
 
123 See, e.g., Feedback Statement: Summary of Responses to the Commission Green Paper on the 
EU Corporate Governance Framework 16 (Nov. 15, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/
docs/modern/20111115-feedback-statement_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VKR9-YVAE] (explaining that many 
people believe granting minority shareholders additional rights to help them represent their interests 
could increase the potential for the abuse of those rights and would be “contrary to shareholder equality”). 
124 See, e.g., In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 500-05, 520-36 (Del. Ch. 2013) (noting 
that “the majority-of-the-minority vote condition qualifies as a cleansing device under traditional 
Delaware corporate law principles”); Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 
88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 461 (2008) (surveying the prevalence of majority-of-minority shareholder 
approval for self-dealing transactions in a large number of jurisdictions, and emphasizing this 
requirement’s crucial role in protecting public investors). 
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CONCLUSION 
Corporate law has long relied on independent directors to protect public 
investors from controller opportunism in conflicted decisions. In this Article, 
however, we have shown that independent directors whose election and 
retention is fully dependent on the controller cannot be relied upon to 
adequately perform their oversight role.  
To make independent directors more effective in overseeing conflicted 
decisions, we have argued, public investors should have the power to influence 
the election or retention of some “enhanced-independence” directors. These 
enhanced-independence directors should play a key role in vetting conflicted 
decisions, but they should not be able to prevent the controller or their fellow 
directors from making other corporate decisions. 
We have discussed how the Delaware courts, as well as other lawmakers in 
the United States and around the world, can introduce enhanced-independence 
arrangements. In Delaware, judicial doctrines encouraging the introduction of 
enhanced-independence directors can address challenges that courts have faced 
in reviewing conflicted decisions in controlled companies. We have identified 
alternative mechanisms for providing public investors with a say over the 
appointment or retention of enhanced-independence directors, and we have 
analyzed the tradeoffs that these mechanisms entail. We have also discussed the 
desirable role of such directors and have responded to a number of objections 
to their use. Our hope is that the approach and framework of analysis we have 
put forward in this Article will serve courts and lawmakers in improving 
investor protection in controlled companies. 
